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BOOK REVIEWS
GovrN
TAL LIABILITY. By H. Street. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953. Pp. 221. $5.00.
The question of the individual's right to sue the state has in recent
times been moved from the realm of academic debate to that of popular clamor and legislative action. In part, this change comes as a
result of increased state activity in areas traditionally carried on by
private interests, but more significantly perhaps, it is part and parcel
of times in which the notion of anyone's immunity from liability, be
it charitable institution, government, insane person or infant, sits
uneasily with democratic principles. Attack upon these traditional
immunities is occurring in such widely divergent fields as parentchild, husband-wife and charitable hospital-patient. In the realm of
government, the enactment in the United States of the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 19461 and in Great Britain of the Crown Proceedings
Act of 19472 gives evidence of this change.3 Professor Street now
recalls for us in this book the fact that the problem is by no means
unique to Anglo-American law, but is well-nigh universal, and so
sets out to explain how the problem is met elsewhere with a view to
making such recommendations and appraisals concerning the situation as seem to him most useful. Such is the subject of this fourtli
published study in the Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law.
Professor Street, as is the case with every writer who attempts to
deal with a legal subject comparatively, had to resolve two questions
at the outset: what jurisdictions would be covered by the study, and
in what form would the results of the comparisons be presented?
The first question was resolved by the author by concentrating primarily upon Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, the United
States and France, with occasional reference to other countries such
as Belgium, Germany and Italy. Some restrictions being necessary,
this choice seems a sound one and enables Professor Street to contrast the modern Anglo-American system with the French system
of administrative courts. The author resolved the second questionl
by presenting his material under such traditional headings as Tort,
Contract, Quasi-Contract, Expropriation, Remedies and Procedure.
Thus there is emphasis upon the functional problem presented rather
1. 60 STAT. 842 (1946).

2. 10 & 11 GEo. 5, c. 44 (1947).

3. In the realm of municipal immunity, see the vigorous dissent of Terrell,

J., in City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34, 38 (Fla. 1953).
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than upon the competing theories involved in supporting or denying
liability. Such an approach will make his study more acceptable to
the "practical" scholar or lawyer, but may well leave the scholar,
who sees in the problem a basic conflict of theories, with a feeling
that the method left something to be desired.
The greater portion of the study is devoted to a careful and detailed consideration of governmental liability in tort and contract
in Great Britain and the United States. This is done by means of an
analysis of the Crown Proceedings Act in Great Britain and of th
Federal Tort Claims Act and Tucker Act in the United States with
useful references to the system in France. These topics will likely
hold interest for the American practitioner. The student of comparative institutions will be interested in Professor Street's evaluation
of the French system of administrative courts as compared with the
Anglo-American primary use of the ordinary civil courts for actions
against the state, and in his conclusion that there seems to be no
need for separate administrative courts in the Anglo-American system. To this reviewer, the most challenging part of the book is that
in which the author deals with procedural and substantive limitations on the liability of the state. Here such important questions are
broached as that of whether the Executive or the Judiciary is more
competent to assess the "public interest"4 (p.177), for example, in
compelling the production of official documents or in permitting
action to be brought on matters of "policy." But it is precisely in this
area that this reviewer finds that the author deals too sparingly with
the competing theories which underlie the dilemma of immunity or
accountability. The author admits that herein is raised "one of the
(p.178). Certainly
fundamental problems of administrative law."'
in these days of widespread use by government of the investigative
power, this is one of the areas in which the individual may need protection from the state. Hence, it is disappointing to find so little
attention paid to this question.
Professor Street is presently Professor of Law in the University
of Nottingham. Much of the research on this book was done in the
United States during his tenure of a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship
in 1947-8. The list of works cited and of decisions and statutes reviewed testify to the breadth and depth of his research. By way of
minor comment, one wonders why the author omitted reference to
'the case of United States v. Humphrey's Executor4 at page 117 in
connection with his discussion of Myers v. United States.
The book stands as a fine beginning in this little developed field
4. 295 U.S. 602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935).
5. 272 U.S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).
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of comparative study. It should interest the political scientists as

well as the jurist. It points up the fact that "much reform is called
for before the individual has adequate protection against the administration" (p.186) although the author does not go the full way in
suggesting specific reforms. It puts into context for Americans the
curious fact that the colonies, having separated themselves from Great
Britain by a revolution grounded upon a list of expressed grievances
against the state, yet received with the common law of England a
doctrine of sovereign immunity which had been developed in feudalism and monarchy.
mA_ F. STONE*
F_

RomAN LAW AND CovnvoN LAw: A Co1AiusoN IN OuTLNEn. By W. W.
Buckland and Arnold D. McNair. Second Edition, Revised by
F. H. Lawson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952.
Pp. xii, 439. $7.00.
The first edition of this work was published in 1936. The present
second edition was done after the great Buckland's death in 1946 by
his co-author, Professor McNair, and by Professor Lawson who is
known to American scholars for his comparative-legal masterpiece
on negligence.1 Roman law has not changed essentially since 1936
and so it is not amazing that this edition does not differ materially
from its predecessor. It is too bad though that the authors could not
avail themselves of Pharr's Theodosian Code2 and of Jolowicz's recent second edition;3 but even if they had, their work would probably
not have undergone any telling alteration inasmuch as it deals with
Roman law chiefly in a dogmatic fashion, describing the law rather
than its history or philosophy. This is not to say that the learned
authors have failed to give a historic sketch of many institutions,
from the law of the Twelve Tables to Justinian. Yet the emphasis
is on Justinian's compilation-on the Roman law as it has been known
in the late and post-medieval world.
As such it is eminently useful. It acquaints the common-law reader
with the basic principles of the developed Roman law-no more, no
less. The book is not intended to be read by non-lawyers who want
*Professor of Law and Director of Institute of Comparative Law, Tulane
University.
1. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIvIL LAw (1950).
2. PnARa, THE THEODosrAN CODE (1952). See Parker, Book Review, 6 VAND.
L. REv. 965 (1953).
3. JOLOWICZ, HISTORUCAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN L&w (1952).
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to study Roman law; some basic knowldege of our law is indispensible to an understanding of the authors' comparison with the law
of Rome. The purpose of the book-to be useful to common lawyershas inevitably induced the authors to adhere to a common-law arrangement and approach, although this system has not been carried
through. Thus the discussion of agency, adequate in itself as far as it
goes, is limited by the omission of a treatment of the mandatum, which
comes close to the civil law of agency. In our law, one who acts for another is his agent whether he is authorized to represent the principal
(disclosed principal) or not (undisclosed principal); every mandatee is
also an agent, at least if the third party finds and "discloses" the
underlying relation. Under the Roman mandatum there was no
agency in the sense of representation; and under modem civil law
the situation is the same if the principal cares to stay "undisclosed."
But the Romans did have a rudimentary form of agency which the
authors discuss 4 under "Agency," which chapter, however, excludes
the mandate, which is discussed elsewhere in the chapter on consensual contracts. Now, a common lawyer would expect everything
to be discussed together in the Agency chapter, whereas a civilian
would treat, as his Roman counterpart did, the mandate amongst the
consensual contracts and agency, such as the Roman did know it, in
the chapter on quasi-contracts as which this institution was conceived.
I realize of course that the goal of satisfying the systematic idiosyncrasies of both legal worlds in one book is something that can be only
assymptotically approximated.
The work is basic in its character although it branches out here
and there to delve into one of the many problems that have beset the
ever argumentative world of civil and Roman lawyers. One of these
topics-on contributory negligence-is particularly well worth reading. One should hope that it destroys the persistently reiterated
myth that the Romans knew anything about comparative negligence,
which as the revisor has made clear in his own erudite study,5 has
its origin in the natural-law application of the Austrian Civil Code of
1811 and not in any provision of the Roman law.
The co-author's Excursus on tort Duty of Care is as confusing as
any discussion on this subject ever has been. It strikes me as singularly unnecessary in a book whose main author, the late Buckland,
has so lucidly disposed of this matter. 6 The Excursus of course ac4. Le., the institor (business manager), see DIGEST 14. 3. 5. 1. Likewise was
the shipowner (exercitor) liable for acts of his magister navis (captain).
DIGEST 14. 1. 1. 9. The authors, however, mention only the actio institoria
but not the actio exercitoria.
5. Supra, note 1.
6. BucKLAND, SomI REFLECTIONS ON JURISPRUDENCE 110-15 (1945).
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knowledges Buckland's aversion against the duty of care concept, but
McNair's attempt at refutation is an unconvincing attempt to call a
spade a shovel.
I would also disagree with the authors' hazy treatment of symbolic
delivery. The classical Roman lawyers had invented the traditio
brevi manu (delivery by mere declaration, to someone who has the
thing already, e.g., as a borrower). The Byzantine lawyers around
Justinian's time added the constitutum possessorium (delivery by
mere declaration of him who now holds the thing for someone else,
e.g., the owner says that he holds the thing now as a borrower). The
latter was probably not in general use before the Glossators although
it was adopted in the codes of both the Visigoths7 and Burgundians.8
Be this as it may, the symbolic tradition, such as delivery by surrendering the key or title document to a house, was unknown to
Roman law except for gifts, where, strange as this may seem to us,
the legal formalities were relaxed. From the authors' discussion at
pages 112-14 one might get the impression that symbolic delivery
was known not only to the civil but also to Roman law. If this is
the authors' opinion then it is in contrast to the generally prevailing
theory and would therefore have needed further explanation and
elaboration
However, it would do no good to give the impression that I were set
to detract from the great scholarly value of the book. It accomplishes,
more than any other work, to make Roman law popular with AngloAmerican lawyers.
REGINALD PARKER*

7. BEvwum ALnAci 8. 5. 2.
8. LEx ROmANA BuRGUNDIONUm 22. 5.
9. The article by Riccobono which the authors cite does not at all support
the idea that the Romans recognized the traditioficta.
*Professor of Law, Willamette University.

